I am an Assistant Professor in Computer Science & Engineering at New York University across the Tandon School of Engineering, which is linked to the Courant Institute School of Mathematics, Computing, and Data Science.
I study how to make emerging technologies safer for every individual, with a focus on interpersonal abuse, malicious insider attacks, and financial harms. My work sits at the intersection of Computer Security and Privacy (S&P) and Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) to: (a) understand abusive adversariesβ goals, skills, and attack strategies; (b) design socio-technical interventions that help the targets of these attacks; and (c) improve abusability tooling for digital technologies to ensure abuse is harder to enact in the first place.
My approach encompasses both proactive and reactive anti-abuse strategies to benefit academic theory and drive real-world impact. To proactively address technology-enabled abuse, I lead efforts to redesign consumer-facing technologies by detecting areas of misuse, and develop digital tools that intervene with abusers to prevent harmful behavior. I couple these efforts with direct, reactive security services for survivors subject to ongoing attacks, and consult with consumer-facing banking, legal, and security services to offer targeted solutions that mitigate harm. My work has been very generously supported by the National Science Foundation, Volkswagenstiftung Foundation, alongside gifts from Google, JPMorgan Chase, and the Craig Newmark Foundation. My research is also recognized by MIT Media Review 35 Innovators under 35, and has been featured in dozens of media outlets including Forbes, Business Insider, BBC, Science News, and MarketWatch.
I co-lead the NUX Seminar with Vedant Das Swain which is an initiative to bring together like-minded folk across NYU with a passion for human-computer interaction. I also care about ensuring that publishing and conferences are safe contexts for all. As service to my community, I act as a core member of SIGCHI CARES to oversee cases in violation of ACMβs policies governing SIG activities (incl. sexual harassment, abuse, plagiarism, falsification).
Previously, I had a wonderful time as a postdoctoral scholar with Associate Prof. Nicola Dell and Prof. Thomas Ristenpart at Cornell Tech and helped to lead the Clinic to End Tech Abuse as the Director of Research. I also earned my Ph.D. in Computer Science across the pond at Open Lab at Newcastle University in the UK.
Recent news
- π¬ Sep 2026: Attending the “Security Research Ethics Seminar” at Dagstuhl Schloss, Germany.
- π¬ Sep 2026: Attending the “Emerging Partners Ministerial Round Table” at the United Nations, NY.
- π¬ Sep 2026: Attending the “Criminal AI Supply Chains and VAWG Workshop” at the Alan Turing Institute, UK.
- π¬ Sep 2026: Attended the “There is no offline” with the NYC Cyber Abuse Task Force, Brooklyn, NY. It was so great to be amongst such intelligent, passionate individuals making such a huge difference in mitigating of technology-facilitated abuse.
- π£ Sep 2026: I am recruiting PhD students for the upcoming cycle ’26-’27. Apply here.
- π Sep 2026: I was selected for MIT Technology Review’s 35 Innovators under 35 for 2026!
- βοΈ Aug 2026: Attended USENIX Security in Baltimore, MD.
- π¬ Aug 2026: Hosted the Ethics & Stakeholder Analysis Breakout at the Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace Biennial PI Meeting DC, MD.
- π£ Jul 2026: I am recruiting a postdoc, starting Spring 2027. Apply here.
- π May 2026: Two more of our papers were accepted at USENIX Security! In one paper, we show that adversarial passkeys generate a huge amount of confusion to users; in one paper also describes how intimate threats are pervasive for micro-business owners.
- π‘ Apr 2026: Awarded generous gift funding from Newmark Philanthropies to start a cyberclinic fighting financial harms and scams for under-resourced organizations and individuals.
- βοΈ Apr 2026: Attended CHI’2026 in Barcelona, Spain.
- π€ Jan 2026: I gave a talk at Barnard University on technology-enabled financial abuse.
- π Dec 2025: One of our papers were accepted at USENIX Security! In this paper we present the largest measurement study of account security interfaces to date, and identify more than 25% provide no way to differentiate adversarial account access.